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Fudenberg and Harris’ stochastic version of the classical repli-
cator dynamics is considered. The behavior of this diffusion process
in the presence of an evolutionarily stable strategy is investigated.
Moreover, extinction of dominated strategies and stochastic stability
of strict Nash equilibria are studied. The general results are illus-
trated in connection with a discrete war of attrition. A persistence
result for the maximum effort strategy is obtained and an explicit
expression for the evolutionarily stable strategy is derived.
1. Introduction. The deterministic replicator dynamics is one of the
most widely used dynamical models to describe the evolution of a pop-
ulation under selection. The evolution is governed by a symmetric two-
player game with n pure strategies, 1, . . . , n. Let ajk denote the pay-off
to a player using strategy j against an opponent playing strategy k. Let
A= (ajk). Suppose that every individual of the population is programmed
to play one fixed pure strategy. For every point of time t≥ 0, let ζj(t) de-
note the size of the subpopulation whose individuals play strategy j, and
let ξj(t) = ζj(t)/[ζ1(t)+ · · ·+ ζn(t)] denote the proportion of j-players in the
population. If the population state is ξ(t) = (ξ1(t), . . . , ξn(t))
T , then {Aξ(t)}j
is the average pay-off to individuals playing j, when individuals are paired
at random. Suppose that the pay-off represents the increase of fitness, mea-
sured as the number of offspring per unit of time. Then
dζj(t)
dt
= ζj(t){Aξ(t)}j , j = 1, . . . , n,(1.1)
and so
dξj(t)
dt
= ξj(t)[{Aξ(t)}j − ξ(t)TAξ(t)], j = 1, . . . , n.(1.2)
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This is the deterministic replicator dynamics of Taylor and Jonker (1978).
See Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998) and Nowak and Sigmund (2004) for de-
tailed discussions from a biological point of view and Weibull (1995) for a
description in an economic context. See also Hofbauer and Sigmund (2003)
for an extensive survey of deterministic evolutionary game dynamics.
Recently, models of evolutionary dynamics which incorporate stochastic
effects have attracted substantial interest. The seminal paper of Foster and
Young (1990) seems to be the first that presents a continuous-time replica-
tor model based on a stochastic differential equation. Kandori, Mailath and
Rob (1993) study a related discrete-time system. The present paper investi-
gates the stochastic replicator dynamics introduced by Fudenberg and Harris
(1992). This model is related to that of Foster and Young, but exhibits a
boundary behavior that appears to be more realistic from a biological per-
spective. Following Fudenberg and Harris (1992), consider the stochastic
variant of (1.1),
dZj(t) =Zj(t)[{AX(t)}j dt+ σj dWj(t)], j = 1, . . . , n,(1.3)
where (W1(t), . . . ,Wn(t))
T =W (t) is an n-dimensional Brownian motion,
σ1, . . . , σn are positive coefficients and
X(t) = (X1(t), . . . ,Xn(t))
T =
1
Z1(t) + · · ·+Zn(t)(Z1(t), . . . ,Zn(t))
T .
The evolution of the population state X(t) is then given by the stochastic
replicator dynamics
dX(t) = b(X(t))dt+C(X(t))dW (t),(1.4)
where
b(x) = [diag(x1, . . . , xn)− xxT ][A− diag(σ21 , . . . , σ2n)]x
and
C(x) = [diag(x1, . . . , xn)− xxT ] diag(σ1, . . . , σn)
for x ∈∆= {y ∈ (0,1)n : y1 + · · ·+ yn = 1}. In many interesting situations,
the deterministic differential equation (1.2) has a stationary point in ∆,
which corresponds to a population state where every pure strategy is present.
In fact every Nash equilibrium is stationary. On the other hand, the only
stationary points for the stochastic differential equation (1.4) are the vertices
of ∆, corresponding to populations consisting of one common type of players.
A series of important results on the behavior of the stochastic replicator
dynamics have been established for the case where the underlying game has
two pure strategies. For example, Fudenberg and Harris (1992) and Saito
(1997) examine properties of ergodic distributions, Amir and Berninghaus
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(1998) establish a result on equilibrium selection and Corradi and Sarin
(2000) provide an asymptotic analysis. However, a large part of the argu-
ments used there is tailored to the case n= 2 and cannot be extended to the
general case n> 2. This is because when n= 2 one basically deals with one-
dimensional diffusion processes, and many of the tools available for these
processes are not applicable to higher-dimensional diffusions, which corre-
spond to games with three or more pure strategies. In particular, in the
general case, an approach via analyzing a closed form expression of the sta-
tionary distribution is not possible.
The present paper investigates (1.4) in the general case n≥ 2. Section 2
establishes a connection between stable behavior of the processes X(t) and
the static concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), which has been
introduced by Maynard Smith and Price (1973). Under suitable conditions,
it is shown that if an ESS exists, then X(t) is recurrent and the stationary
distribution concentrates mass in a small neighborhood of the ESS. Explicit
bounds for the expected time to reach that neighborhood are also given. Sec-
tion 3 investigates dominated strategies. It is shown that the probability that
the frequency of a dominated strategy is above a prescribed level decreases
exponentially quickly to zero. Interestingly, it turns out that, depending on
the sizes of the stochastic terms, weakly dominated strategies may become
extinct in the stochastic model (1.4) even if they survive in the deterministic
model (1.2). In Section 4 a sufficient condition is derived for a Nash equilib-
rium to be asymptotically stochastically stable. In this connection another
example emerges which shows that the deterministic model and the stochas-
tic model can lead to quite different predictions: In the Prisoner’s Dilemma,
the strategy “defect” is a strict Nash equilibrium and becomes predominant
under (1.2), but may become extinct under (1.4).
By way of illustration, a discrete variant of the war of attrition is analyzed
in some detail in the last section. This is a model which describes conflicts
that are settled by display rather than violence; see Maynard Smith (1982).
A rather general theorem on the persistence of the maximum effort strategy
is obtained as a consequence of the results in Section 2. Furthermore, ex-
plicit expressions for ESSs are derived; the ESSs are given in terms of linear
combinations of Chebyshev polynomials of the second kind evaluated along
the imaginary axis. This yields a fairly accurate picture of the long-run be-
havior of the stochastic replicator dynamics when the conflicts are modeled
by a war of attrition.
Hofbauer and Sigmund [(1998), Section 7.5] show that the deterministic
replicator equation is, in a sense, equivalent to the deterministic Lotka–
Volterra equation. The behavior of solutions to this equation under ran-
dom perturbations has recently been investigated by Khasminskii and Kle-
baner (2001), Klebaner and Liptser (2001) and Skorokhod, Hoppensteadt
and Salehi [(2002), Section 11]. There is almost no overlap with the results
presented here.
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2. Stochastic replicator dynamics and evolutionarily stable strategies.
The concept of a Nash equilibrium is too weak to yield reasonable con-
vergence or stability results for (1.4). A somewhat stronger concept, which
is of fundamental importance in evolutionary game theory, is that of an evo-
lutionarily stable strategy (ESS), introduced by Maynard Smith and Price
(1973). The closure ∆ of ∆ is also referred to as the set of mixed strategies.
A strategy p ∈∆ is said to be an ESS if the following two conditions hold:
(i) pTAp≥ qTAp for all q ∈∆,
and
(ii) if q 6= p and pTAp= qTAp, then pTAq> qTAq.
This static concept lies between that of a Nash and a strict Nash equilibrium,
and turns out to be particularly relevant to the long-run analysis of (1.4).
For x ∈∆, let Px denote the probability measure corresponding to the
process X(t) with initial condition X(0) = x, and let Ex denote expectation
with respect to Px. Note that Px{X(t) ∈∆ for all t≥ 0}= 1 for all x ∈∆.
Let P (t,x,G) = Px{X(t) ∈G} for all Borel subsets G⊂∆. Let τG = inf{t >
0 :X(t) ∈G}. For δ > 0, let Uδ(x) = {y ∈∆:‖y−x‖< δ}, where ‖·‖ denotes
the Euclidean norm. Let ej denote the jth unit vector in R
n and let 1 ∈
R
n denote the vector all of whose entries are 1. The mixed strategy ej is
identified with the pure strategy j. The matrix A is said to be conditionally
negative definite if
yTAy< 0 for all y ∈Rn such that 1Ty= 0,y 6= 0.
Theorem 2.1. Let X(t) be given by the stochastic replicator dynamics
(1.4) and let p ∈∆ be an ESS for the underlying pay-off matrix A. Set A=
1
2 (A+A
T ), and let λ2 be the second largest eigenvalue (counting multiplicity)
of
A− 1
n
A11T − 1
n
11TA+
1TA1
n2
11T .
Then
λ2 < 0.(2.1)
Define κ > 0 by
κ2 =
1
2
n∑
j=1
pjσ
2
j −
1
2
∑n
j=1 σ
−2
j
,
and suppose that
κ <
n
n− 1
√
|λ2| min
1≤j≤n
pj.(2.2)
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Then X(t) is recurrent, there exists a unique invariant probability measure pi
on ∆, and for every initial value x ∈∆, the transition probabilities P (t,x, ·)
converge to pi in total variation. Moreover, for every δ > κ/
√|λ2|,
(a) pi{Uδ(p)} ≥ 1− κ
2
|λ2|δ2 ,
(b) ExτUδ(p) ≤
d(x,p)
|λ2|δ2 − κ2 ,
(2.3)
and for every t > 0,
Ex
1
t
∫ t
0
‖X(s)−p‖2 ds≤ 1|λ2|
{
d(x,p)
t
+ κ2
}
,(2.4)
where d(x,p) =
∑
j : pj>0 pj log(pj/xj) is the Kullback–Leibler distance be-
tween x and p.
Inequalities (2.1), (2.3)(b) and (2.4) also hold if the ESS p ∈∆, provided
that A is conditionally negative definite.
Remark 2.1. The quantity |λ2| can be interpreted as a measure of how
strongly the ESS p attracts X(t) to a neighborhood of p.
Remark 2.2. Foster and Young (1990) point out that, in view of its lo-
cal character, the ESS condition is not “quite the right concept of dynamical
stability in a biological context.” It is therefore not surprising that in the
above theorem the ESS condition is augmented by some additional require-
ment: that κ be not too large and that A be conditionally negative definite
if p ∈ ∂∆. The second condition is easily seen to be satisfied in the examples
in Section 5. Bapat and Raghavan [(1997), Section 4.1] provide some criteria
to check whether a given matrix is conditionally negative definite.
The proof of Theorem 2.1 requires the following auxiliary result.
Lemma 2.1. Let A ∈ Rn×n, n ≥ 2, be a conditionally negative definite
matrix and let λ2 be the second largest eigenvalue of
D :=A− 1
n
A11T − 1
n
11TA+
1TA1
n2
11T ,
where A= 12(A+A
T ). Then
max
xT 1=0
x 6=0
xTAx
xTx
= λ2 < 0.
6 L. A. IMHOF
Proof. Note first that
xTDx= xTAx for all x ∈Rn such that 1Tx= 0.(2.5)
The vector 1 is an eigenvector of D corresponding to the eigenvalue λ1 = 0.
Thus if λ is another eigenvalue of D with corresponding eigenvector y, then
1Ty= 0. It then follows from (2.5) and the assumption that A is condition-
ally negative definite that
λ=
yTDy
yTy
=
yTAy
yTy
≤ 0.
Thus λ1 = 0 is the largest eigenvalue of D, and the variational description
of λ2, the second largest eigenvalue, and (2.5) yield
λ2 = max
xT 1=0
x 6=0
xTDx
xTx
= max
xT1=0
x 6=0
xTAx
xTx
< 0.

Proof of Theorem 2.1. Let L denote the second-order differential
operator associated with X(t), that is,
Lf(x) =
n∑
j=1
bj(x)
∂f(x)
∂xj
+
1
2
n∑
j,k=1
γjk(x)
∂2f(x)
∂xj ∂xk
, f ∈C2(∆),(2.6)
where
bj(x) = xj(ej − x)T [A− diag(σ21 , . . . , σ2n)]x,
γjk(x) =
n∑
ν=1
cjν(x)ckν(x),
cjk(x) =
{
xj(1− xj)σj , j = k,
−xjxkσk, j 6= k.
Suppose first that p ∈∆, and set g(x) = d(x,p) =∑j pj log(pj/xj) for all
x ∈∆. Then, for all x, g(x)≥ 0 and
Lg(x) =−
n∑
j=1
pj(ej − x)T [A− diag(σ21 , . . . , σ2n)]x
+ 12
n∑
j=1
pj
(
σ2j − 2xjσ2j +
n∑
k=1
x2kσ
2
k
)
= (x−p)TAx− 12
n∑
j=1
x2jσ
2
j +
1
2
n∑
j=1
pjσ
2
j .
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As p is evolutionarily stable, (x−p)TAp≤ 0. Since p ∈∆, A is conditionally
negative definite. This follows from the proof of Haigh’s theorem (1975).
Hence, in view of Lemma 2.1,
(x− p)TAx≤ (x− p)TA(x−p)≤ λ2‖x−p‖2
and λ2 < 0. The Cauchy–Schwarz inequality gives 1≤ (
∑n
j=1 x
2
jσ
2
j )
∑n
j=1 σ
−2
j ,
so that −∑nj=1 x2jσ2j ≤−(∑nj=1 σ−2j )−1. It now follows that
Lg(x)≤ λ2‖x−p‖2 + κ2, x ∈∆.(2.7)
Suppose that δ2 > κ2/|λ2|. For every x ∈∆\Uδ(p), Lg(x)≤ λ2δ2+κ2, and it
follows by Itoˆ’s formula that g(X(t))−(λ2δ2+κ2)t is a local supermartingale
on [0, τUδ(p)). Hence [cf. proof of Theorem 5.3 in Durrett (1996), page 268]
g(x)≥ (|λ2|δ2 − κ2)ExτUδ(p), proving (2.3)(b).
To prove recurrence, consider the transformed process Y (t) = Ψ(X(t)),
where Ψ :∆→ Rn−1 is defined by Ψ(x) = (log(x1/xn), . . . , log(xn−1/xn))T .
One has
dYj(t) = {(ej − en)TAΨ−1(Y (t))− 12(σ2j − σ2n)}dt+ σj dWj(t)− σn dWn(t),
j = 1, . . . , n− 1,
where Ψ−1(y) = (1 + ey1 + · · ·+ eyn−1)−1(ey1 , . . . , eyn−1 ,1)T . Note that the
second-order differential operator associated with Y (t) is uniformly elliptic.
It will next be shown that ∂Uδ0 has positive distance from ∂∆ for some δ0 >
κ/
√|λ2|. This implies that Ψ(Uδ0) is a compact set. In view of (2.3)(b) it will
then follow that Y (t) is recurrent [Bhattacharya (1978) and Khas’minskii
(1960)] and the transition probabilities converge in total variation to the
unique stationary probability measure [Durrett (1996), Chapter 7]. The same
applies then to X(t). By (2.2), one may choose δ0 such that κ/
√|λ2|< δ0 <
(n/(n− 1))minj pj . Suppose y ∈ Rn,
∑n
j=1 yj = 1 and ‖y− p‖ = δ0. Let j0
be such that |yj0 − pj0 |=max1≤j≤n |yj − pj|, and set
z=
(
yj0 − pj0 ,
pj0 − yj0
n− 1 , . . . ,
pj0 − yj0
n− 1
)T
∈Rn.
One may verify that z is majorized by y− p in the sense of Definition A.1
in Marshall and Olkin [(1979), page 7], and it follows from Proposition C.1
in Marshall and Olkin [(1979), page 64] that
δ20 =
n∑
j=1
(yj − pj)2 ≥
n∑
j=1
z2j =
(
1 +
1
n− 1
)
(yj0 − pj0)2
=
n
n− 1 max1≤j≤n(yj − pj)
2.
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Thus, for every j, yj ≥ min1≤k≤n pk − (n − 1)δ0/n > 0, showing that the
distance between ∂Uδ0 and ∂∆ is positive.
For K > g(x) let τ˜K = inf{t > 0 :g(X(t)) =K}. Then, by Dynkin’s for-
mula and (2.7),
0≤ Exg(X(t ∧ τ˜K)) = g(x) +Ex
∫ t∧τ˜K
0
Lg(X(s))ds
≤ g(x) + λ2Ex
∫ t∧τ˜K
0
‖X(s)−p‖2 ds+ κ2Ex(t ∧ τ˜K).
If K →∞, then t ∧ τ˜k → t, and (2.4) follows by the bounded convergence
theorem. To prove (2.3)(a), let χ
U
C
δ (p)
denote the indicator function of
U
C
δ (p) = ∆ \U δ(p). Then, by (2.4),
pi(U
C
δ (p)) = limt→∞
Ex
1
t
∫ t
0
χ
U
C
δ (p)
(X(s))ds
≤ lim
t→∞
Ex
1
t
∫ t
0
‖X(s)−p‖2
δ2
ds≤ κ
2
|λ2|δ2 .
An inspection of the above arguments shows that if A is conditionally neg-
ative definite, then (2.1), (2.3)(b) and (2.4) hold if the ESS p ∈ ∂∆. In this
case, however, X(t) need not be recurrent. 
If p is an ESS for A, then there exists a constant c ∈R such that {Ap}j = c
for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n} with pj > 0; see Hofbauer and Sigmund [(1998), page
63]. Thus
[diag(p1, . . . , pn)−ppT ]Ap= 0,
so that the drift vector b(x) of the stochastic differential equation (1.4) will
in general not be zero at x= p. If, however, p is an ESS for the modified
pay-off matrix B =A− diag(σ21 , . . . , σ2n), then b(p) = 0. From this point of
view it is more natural to investigate the distance between X(t) and an ESS
for B. A simple modification of the proof of Theorem 2.1 yields the following
result. The analogous results on recurrence and the stationary distribution
are omitted for brevity.
Theorem 2.2. Let X(t) be given by the stochastic replicator dynamics
(1.4) with underlying pay-off matrix A. Let p ∈∆ be an ESS for the modified
pay-off matrix A−diag(σ21 , . . . , σ2n). Suppose also that A−diag(12σ21, . . . , 12σ2n)
is conditionally negative definite. Then for every initial state x ∈ ∆ and
every t > 0,
Ex
1
t
∫ t
0
‖X(s)−p‖2 ds≤ 1|λ′2|
{
d(x,p)
t
+
1
2
n∑
j=1
pj(1− pj)σ2j
}
,(2.8)
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where d(x,p) =
∑
j : pj>0 pj log(pj/xj) and λ
′
2 is the second largest eigenvalue
of
A− 1
n
A11T − 1
n
11TA+
1TA1
n2
11T ,
where A= 12 [A+A
T − diag(σ21 , . . . , σ2n)].
Remark 2.3. If the ESS p ∈∆, it follows that A− diag(σ21 , . . . , σ2n) is
conditionally negative definite, so that in this case, the assumption that
A− diag(12σ21 , . . . , 12σ2n) should be conditionally negative definite is not very
restrictive. To compare (2.4) and (2.8) note that |λ′2|> |λ2| and
1
2
n∑
j=1
pj(1− pj)σ2j ≤−
1
2
∑n
j=1 σ
−2
j
+
1
2
n∑
j=1
pjσ
2
j .
3. Extinction of dominated strategies. This section is concerned with
the evolution of strategies that are inferior to other strategies in the sense
of domination.
A strategy p ∈∆ is said to be weakly dominated by strategy q ∈∆ if
pTAr≤ qTAr for all r ∈∆
with strict inequality for some r. If the inequality is strict for all r, then p
is said to be strictly dominated by q.
For the deterministic replicator dynamics (1.2), Akin (1980) has shown
that strictly dominated pure strategies become extinct; more precisely, their
frequencies in the population converge to zero. Theorem 3.1 establishes that
under the stochastic replicator dynamics (1.4) even pure strategies that are
only weakly dominated become extinct under a suitable condition on the
diffusion coefficients σ1, . . . , σn. Theorem 3.1 also gives an upper bound for
the probability that at a given point of time t the frequency of a dominated
strategy is above a prescribed value ε > 0. The bound converges exponen-
tially quickly to zero as t→∞.
Theorem 3.1. Let X(t) be given by (1.4). Suppose that the pure strategy
k is weakly dominated by some mixed strategy p ∈∆. Set c1 =minq∈∆pTAq−
eTkAq and suppose that σ1, . . . , σn are such that
c2 =−σ
2
k
2
+
1
2
n∑
j=1
pjσ
2
j < c1.(3.1)
Then for every initial state x ∈∆,
Px{Xk(t) = o(exp[−(c1 − c2)t+3σmax
√
t log log t ])}= 1,
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and for 0< ε< 1 and t > 0,
Px{Xk(t)> ε}< 1−Φ
{
c3(x) + log ε+ (c1 − c2)t
σmax
√
2t
}
,
where Φ(v) is the normal distribution function, σmax =max{σ1, . . . , σn} and
c3(x) =
∑n
j=1 pj log(xj/xk).
Proof. LetH(t) = logXk(t)−
∑n
j=1 pj logXj(t) for t≥ 0. Then, by Itoˆ’s
formula,
H(t) =H(0) +
∫ t
0
eTkAX(s)− pTAX(s)−
σ2k
2
+
1
2
n∑
j=1
pjσ
2
j ds
+ σkWk(t)−
n∑
j=1
pjσjWj(t)
≤H(0) + (c2 − c1)t+ σ˜W˜ (t),
where σ˜ = [(1− pk)2σ2k +
∑
j 6=k p
2
jσ
2
j ]
1/2 and W˜ (t) = [σkWk(t)−
∑n
j=1 pjσj ×
Wj(t)]/σ˜ is a standard Brownian motion. Clearly, σ˜ ≤
√
2σmax. It follows
that Px-almost surely,
lim sup
t→∞
Xk(t) exp[(c1 − c2)t− 3σmax
√
t log log t ]
≤ lim sup
t→∞
exp[H(t) + (c1 − c2)t− 3σmax
√
t log log t ]
≤ lim sup
t→∞
exp[−c3(x) + σ˜W˜ (t)− 3σmax
√
t log log t ] = 0
by the law of the iterated logarithm. Moreover,
Px{Xk(t)> ε} ≤ Px{H(t)> log ε}
≤ Px{−c3(x) + (c2 − c1)t+ σ˜W (t)> log ε}
< 1−Φ
{
c3(x) + log ε+ (c1 − c2)t
σmax
√
2t
}
.

Remark 3.1. Condition (3.1) is always satisfied if k is strictly dom-
inated by p and σ1 = · · · = σn. The condition is also satisfied when k is
merely weakly dominated and σk >σj for every j 6= k. Thus if the diffusion
coefficient corresponding to a weakly dominated strategy is large enough,
its frequency converges to zero. This behavior is different from the behavior
of weakly dominated strategies under the deterministic replicator dynam-
ics where weakly dominated strategies may well persist with any prescribed
positive population share; see Weibull [(1995), Example 3.4, page 84]. This
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difference between the deterministic and the stochastic population dynamics
agrees with the findings of Alvarez (2000) which show that, under mild con-
ditions, “increased stochastic fluctuations decrease the expected population
density.” Cabrales (2000) proves that in a similar stochastic model itera-
tively strictly dominated strategies become rare, provided stochastic effects
are sufficiently small.
Remark 3.2. In the situation of Theorem 3.1,
Px{Xk(t)> ε}= o(e−γt), t→∞,
for any 0 < γ < (c1 − c2)2/(4σ2max). This is easily verified using the bound
1−Φ(v)≤ exp(−v2/2), v > 0.
Remark 3.3. The assumptions of Theorem 3.1 may be satisfied even
if the pure strategy k is not dominated by any other pure strategy. For
example, let
A=
2 2 24 1 1
1 4 4
 and σ22 + σ23
2
< 1 + σ21.
Then the pure strategy 1 is strictly dominated by p= (0, 12 ,
1
2)
T and, accord-
ing to Theorem 3.1, X1(t)→ 0 almost surely, even though neither strategy
2 nor strategy 3 dominates strategy 1.
4. Stochastic stability of Nash equilibria. The last section dealt with the
extinction of pure strategies that were inferior to at least one strategy. The
present section investigates strategies that can be regarded as being locally
superior to all other strategies. The relevant concept is that of a strict Nash
equilibrium.
A strategy p ∈∆ is called a Nash equilibrium if
pTAp≥ qTAp for all q ∈∆.
If the inequality is strict for all q 6= p, then p is a strict Nash equilibrium.
In other words, a Nash equilibrium is a best reply to itself, and a strict
Nash equilibrium is the unique best reply to itself. Only pure strategies can
be strict Nash equilibria; see Weibull [(1995), page 15]. Thus if nearly the
whole population plays a strict Nash equilibrium, then the highest pay-off is
obtained by exactly that strategy so that natural selection would not favor
any other strategy. This suggests that a strict Nash equilibrium should be
an asymptotically stable state, which is indeed the case under the determin-
istic replicator dynamics (1.2). This need not be the case for the stochastic
replicator dynamics (1.4), as is illustrated by the following example.
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Example. Consider the Prisoner’s Dilemma game [Hofbauer and Sig-
mund (1998), page 101] with two pure strategies: 1 = co-operate, 2 = defect,
and pay-off matrix
A=
(
a11 a12
a21 a22
)
, a21 > a11 > a22 > a12.
Here strategy 2 is a strict Nash equilibrium and under (1.2), limt→∞ ξ2(t) = 1
for all initial states ξ(0) ∈∆. On the other hand, if
σ22
2
>
σ21
2
+max{a21 − a11, a22 − a12},
then condition (3.1) of Theorem 3.1 is satisfied with k = 2, p = (1,0)T ,
so that Px{limt→∞X1(t) = 1} for all x ∈∆. This is a reasonable behavior,
because if all players co-operate, then the received pay-off, a11, is larger than
a22, the pay-off they receive when all players defect. Thus the stochastic
model may explain the spread of co-operative behavior, which could not be
observed in the deterministic model. This fact agrees with results of Nowak,
Sasaki, Taylor and Fudenberg (2004) who study a discrete-time Markov
chain to explain the emergence of co-operation in a finite population that
plays the Prisoner’s Dilemma game.
The next theorem gives a sufficient condition for a strict Nash equilibrium
to be asymptotically stochastically stable. Notice that a pure strategy k is
a strict Nash equilibrium if and only if akk > ajk for all j 6= k.
Theorem 4.1. Let X(t) be given by (1.4). Let k be a strict Nash equi-
librium. Suppose that σk is so small that
akk > ajk + σ
2
k for all j 6= k.(4.1)
Then ek is asymptotically stochastically stable. That is, for any neighborhood
U of ek and for any ε > 0 there is a neighborhood V of ek such that
Px
{
X(t) ∈ U for all t≥ 0, lim
t→∞
X(t) = ek
}
≥ 1− ε
for every initial state x ∈ V ∩∆.
Proof. The proof is an application of the stochastic Lyapunov method.
Consider the Lyapunov function φ(y) = 1− yk. Evidently, φ(y) ≥ 0 for all
y ∈∆ with equality if and only if y = ek. It will be shown that there is a
constant c > 0 and a neighborhood V0 of ek such that
Lφ(y)≤−cφ(y) for all y ∈ V0 ∩∆,(4.2)
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where L is the differential operator given by (2.6). The assertion then follows
from Theorem 4 and Remark 2 in Gichman and Skorochod [(1971), pages
314 and 315]. Write B =A− diag(σ21 , . . . , σ2n). For all y ∈∆,
Lφ(y) =−yk(ek − y)TBy
= yk
∑
µ6=k
ν 6=k
yµbµνyν − yk(1− yk)
∑
ν 6=k
bkνyν
+ y2k
{
−(1− yk)bkk +
∑
µ6=k
yµbµk
}
.
Let β =max{|bµν | :µ, ν = 1, . . . , n}. Then∑
µ6=k
ν 6=k
yµbµνyν ≤ β
∑
µ6=k
yµ
∑
ν 6=k
yν = β(1− yk)2, −
∑
ν 6=k
bkνyν ≤ β(1− yk).
Moreover, condition (4.1) ensures that for some α > 0, bµk ≤ bkk − α for all
µ 6= k, so that
−(1− yk)bkk +
∑
µ6=k
yµbµk ≤−(1− yk)bkk + (bkk − α)
∑
µ6=k
yµ =−α(1− yk).
Hence
Lφ(y)≤ 2βyk(1− yk)2 −αy2k(1− yk) =−yk{(α+2β)yk − 2β}φ(y),
which proves (4.2) with V0 = {y ∈∆ : yk > 12 α+4βα+2β } and c= α4 . 
Remark 4.1. Condition (4.1) means that k is a strict Nash equilibrium
with respect to the modified pay-off matrix B. If k is only a neutrally stable
strategy with respect to B [see Weibull (1995), Definition 2.4, page 46],
then, by Proposition 2.7 of Weibull [(1995), page 48], Lφ(y) = −yk(ek −
y)TBy ≤ 0 for all y in a certain neighborhood of ek. Hence in this case
Theorem 4 of Gichman and Skorochod [(1971), page 314] yields that ek is
still stochastically stable.
Theorem 4.1 says that if the population is in a state sufficiently near to a
strict Nash equilibrium ek, then, with probability close to 1, that equilibrium
will actually be selected by the stochastic replicator dynamics in the sense
that limt→∞X(t) = ek. If there are several strict Nash equilibria and the
initial state is not close to any of them, it is neither clear which one will be
selected nor in fact if any will be selected at all. The next theorem establishes
that when the underlying game is a coordination game, that is, every pure
stategy is a strict Nash equilibrium, then it is almost certain that one of the
equilibria will be selected.
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Theorem 4.2. Let A be the pay-off matrix of a co-ordination game and
let X(t) be given by (1.4). Suppose that, for every k, σk is so small that
akk > ajk + σ
2
k for all j 6= k. Then, for every initial state x ∈∆,
Px
{
lim
t→∞
X(t) = ek for some k
}
= 1.
The proof hinges on the following theorem, which is of interest in its own
right. It states that for any underlying game, X(t) will come arbitrarily close
to one of the points e1, . . . ,en in finite time.
Theorem 4.3. Let A be an arbitrary pay-off matrix, let X(t) be given
by (1.4) and let x ∈∆. Let ε > 0. Consider the hitting time
τε = inf{t > 0 :Xk(t)≥ 1− ε for some k ∈ {1, . . . , n}}.
Then Exτε <∞. Moreover,
Px
{
sup
t>0
max{X1(t), . . . ,Xn(t)}= 1
}
= 1.
Proof. For α > 0 and y ∈∆ define
φα(y) = φ(y) = ne
α −
n∑
k=1
eαyk .
Let B =A− diag(σ21 , . . . , σ2n) and let L be given by (2.6). Then
Lφ(y) =−α
n∑
k=1
yk(ek−y)TByeαyk− α
2
2
n∑
k=1
y2k
{
σ2k(1−yk)2+
∑
j 6=k
σ2j y
2
j
}
eαyk .
Let β > 0 be such that
|(ek − y)TBy| ≤ β for all y ∈∆ and k ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Let σmin =min{σ1, . . . , σn}. Then
Lφ(y)≤ α
n∑
k=1
yke
αyk
{
β − ασ
2
min
2
yk(1− yk)2
}
.
Let α> 0 be so large that
α
σ2min
2
y(1− y)2 ≥ nβ +1 for all y ∈
[
1
n
,1− ε
]
.
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Suppose that y ∈∆ is such that yk ≤ 1− ε for all k = 1, . . . , n. Then there
is at least one yk in [
1
n ,1− ε], and so
Lφ(y)≤ αβ
∑
k : yk<1/n
yke
αyk +α
∑
k : yk∈[1/n,1−ε]
yke
αyk{−(n− 1)β − 1}
≤ αβ(n− 1)e
α/n
n
+α
eα/n
n
{−(n− 1)β − 1}
≤ −αe
α/n
n
.
Thus, by Dynkin’s formula, for every T <∞,
0≤ Exφ{X(τε ∧ T )}= φ(x) +Ex
∫ τε∧T
0
Lφ(X(s))ds
≤ neα −αe
α/n
n
Ex(τε ∧ T ).
Letting T →∞, one obtains by monotone convergence that Exτε <n2eα/α <
∞.
Choosing ε= 1/m, one obtains in particular that
Px
{
sup
t>0
max{X1(t), . . . ,Xn(t)} ≥ 1− 1
m
}
= 1
for every m ∈N. Hence
Px
{
sup
t>0
max{X1(t), . . . ,Xn(t)}= 1
}
= Px
{
∞⋂
m=1
{
sup
t>0
max{X1(t), . . . ,Xn(t)} ≥ 1− 1
m
}}
= 1.

Proof of Theorem 4.2. Let ε > 0 and suppose that akk > ajk + σ
2
k
for all j, k = 1, . . . , n with j 6= k. Then, for every k, there exists, by Theorem
4.1, some δk > 0 such that
Px
{
lim
t→∞
X(t) = ek
}
> 1− ε if xk ≥ 1− δk.
Set τ = inf{t≥ 0 :Xk(t)≥ 1−δk for some k} and F = {limt→∞X(t) = ek forsome k}.
Let χF denote the indicator function of F . According to Theorem 4.3, τ is
Px-almost surely finite, and so, by the strong Markov property of Itoˆ diffu-
sions,
Px(F ) =ExEX(τ)χF ≥ 1− ε.
As ε > 0 was arbitrary, the assertion follows. 
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5. A discrete war of attrition. Theorems 2.1 and 2.2 show that an ESS,
if it exists, gives precise information about the long-run behavior of the
stochastic replicator dynamics. In this section explicit expressions are de-
rived for ESSs for a discrete variant of the war of attrition, introduced by
Maynard Smith and Price (1973). See Maynard Smith (1982) and Bishop
and Cannings (1978) for a detailed discussion and extensions.
In the discrete symmetric war of attrition each player selects a pure strat-
egy j ∈ {0,1, . . . , n}, which determines the maximum length of time, cj , the
player is willing to display for. The contest progresses until one of the players
has reached his chosen limit; this player leaves and the other player obtains
a reward. The value of the reward is constant or a decreasing function of
the length of the contest. Both players incur a cost given by the length of
the contest. If both players have chosen the same length of time, the reward
is shared.
Specifically, the pay-off matrix A= (ajk), j, k = 0, . . . , n, is given by
ajk =

vk − ck, j > k,
vk
2
− ck, j = k,
−cj , j < k,
(5.1)
where
0≤ c0 < c1 < · · ·< cn and v0 ≥ v1 ≥ · · · ≥ vn > 0.
The corresponding stochastic replicator dynamics is
dX(t) = b(X(t))dt+C(X(t))dW (t),(5.2)
where W (t) denotes an (n+ 1)-dimensional Brownian motion and, for x=
(x0, . . . , xn)
T ,
b(x) = [diag(x0, . . . , xn)− xxT ][A− diag(σ20 , . . . , σ2n)]x
and
C(x) = [diag(x0, . . . , xn)− xxT ] diag(σ0, . . . , σn).
Theorem 2.2 suggests to consider ESSs not only of A but also of the
modified pay-off matrix B = (bjk), j, k = 0, . . . , n, with
bjk =

vk − ck, j > k,
vk
2
− ck − ρk, j = k,
−cj, j < k,
(5.3)
and
0≤ c0 < c1 < · · ·< cn, v0 ≥ v1 ≥ · · · ≥ vn > 0, 0≤ ρk < vk
2
.
The following lemma ensures that the pay-off matrices A and B satisfy
the assumptions in Theorems 2.1 and 2.2. The proof is in the Appendix.
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Lemma 5.1. For the war of attrition with pay-off matrix given by (5.1) or (5.3)
there exists a unique ESS, and the pay-off matrix is conditionally negative
definite.
The next theorem is a basic persistence result for the replicator dynamics,
saying that with probability close to 1 the maximum effort strategy, that
is, strategy n, will not die out. For j = 0, . . . , n, let ej denote the (j + 1)st
column of the unit matrix of order n+1.
Theorem 5.1. Let X(t) be given by the stochastic replicator dynamics
(5.2) with initial state x ∈∆. Let ε > 0. Then there exists σ∗ = σ∗(ε) > 0
such that
Px
{
lim sup
t→∞
Xn(t)> 0
}
≥ 1− ε,
provided that σ0, . . . , σn <σ
∗.
Proof. Let p be the ESS for A. It will first be shown that pn > 0.
Suppose that this is not the case, so that m := max{j :pj > 0} < n. Then
eTm+1Ap ≤ eTmAp, see Hofbauer and Sigmund [(1998), page 63]. As pj = 0
for j >m,
eTmAp=
m−1∑
j=0
(vj − cj)pj +
(
vm
2
− cm
)
pm,
eTm+1Ap=
m∑
j=0
(vj − cj)pj .
Thus
0≤ eTmAp− eTm+1Ap=−
vm
2
pm < 0;
a contradiction. Hence pn > 0.
By Theorem 2.1 and Lemma 5.1, for all t > 0,
Ex
1
t
∫ t
0
|Xn(s)− pn|2 ds≤ 1|λ2|
{
d(x,p)
t
+
1
2
n∑
j=1
pjσ
2
j
}
,
where λ2 6= 0 depends only on A. Choose t0 > 0 and σ∗ > 0 such that
d(x,p)
|λ2|t0 <
p2nε
16
,
(σ∗)2
|λ2| <
p2nε
8
.
Thus if σ0, . . . , σn < σ
∗, then
Ex
1
t
∫ t
0
|Xn(s)− pn|2 ds≤ p
2
nε
8
for all t≥ t0.
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Now consider the increasing sequence of events
Fµ =
{
Xn(s)≤ pn
2
for all s≥ t0+ µ
}
, µ= 1,2, . . . .
For every µ,
p2nε
8
≥ 1
2(t0 + µ)
∫
Fµ
∫ 2(t0+µ)
t0+µ
|Xn(s)− pn|2 ds dPx ≥ p
2
n
8
Px(Fµ),
so that Px(
⋃∞
µ=1Fµ)≤ ε. Hence
Px
{
lim sup
t→∞
Xn(t)> 0
}
≥ Px
(
∞⋂
µ=1
FCµ
)
≥ 1− ε.

In general the ESS for a discrete war of attrition may have a fairly compli-
cated structure. Cressman [(2003), Section 7.4] describes a broad approach
to calculating ESSs for these games using backward induction. Whittaker
(1996) has recently solved several closely related resource allocation prob-
lems based on a multiple trial war of attrition. The following theorem gives
an explicit expression for the ESS in the case where the ρk and the vk are
constant and cj = j for all strategies j. Combining Lemma 5.1 and Theo-
rems 2.1, 2.2 and 5.2, one obtains a fairly complete picture of the long-run
behavior of the stochastic replicator dynamics when the conflicts are mod-
eled by a war of attrition.
Let Um(x) denote the mth Chebyshev polynomial of the second kind, and
let U−1(x)≡ 0. Let i=
√−1.
Theorem 5.2. Consider the war of attrition with pay-off matrix B =
(bjk), j, k = 0, . . . , n, where
bjk =

v− k, j > k,
v
2
− k− ρ, j = k,
−j, j < k,
(5.4)
and 0≤ ρ < 12v. The unique ESS p is given as follows. If the reward v is so
large that v ≥ 2n+ 2ρ, then
p0 = · · ·= pn−1 = 0, pn = 1.
Otherwise there is a unique index s ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} such that
n− 1 + ρ≤ v
2
+ s < n+ ρ,(5.5)
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and
pk =
1
c
(
−v
2
− ρ
)k
×
{
us−k+1+
(
s+1− n+ v
2
+ ρ
)
us−k(5.6)
+ (s+ 1− n)
(
v
2
+ ρ
)
us−k−1
}
, 0≤ k ≤ s,
pk = 0, s+ 1≤ k ≤ n− 1,(5.7)
pn =
1
c
(
−v
2
− ρ
)s+1
,
where
uk = (−iγ)kUk
(
− i(2ρ+ 1)
2γ
)
, γ =
√
v2
4
− ρ2
and
c=−us+2+ (n− s− 1− 2ρ)us+1 + {2ρ(n− s− 1) + γ2}us
− (n− s− 1)γ2us−1.
The proof of this theorem requires some auxiliary results, which are proved
in the Appendix.
It was shown in the proof of Theorem 5.1 that for the war of attrition
(5.3), strategy n is always contained in the support of the ESS. The next
lemma states that for j < n, strategy j can belong to the support only if
the corresponding cost cj is below a certain threshold. This is the discrete
analogue of Theorem 7 of Bishop and Cannings (1978). The lemma explains
in particular the choice of s in Theorem 5.2.
Lemma 5.2. Let p be the ESS for the war of attrition with pay-off matrix
B = (bjk), j, k = 0, . . . , n, described by (5.3). If j < n and cj ≥ cn+ρn− 12vn,
then pj = 0.
The next two lemmas give explicit formulas for determinants related to
the pay-off matrix of a war of attrition. Let Jk denote the k× k matrix with
all entries equal to 1 and let 1k denote the k× 1 vector all of whose entries
are 1.
Lemma 5.3. Let B ∈ R(n+1)×(n+1) be given by (5.3). For k = 0, . . . , n,
let B(k) denote the matrix obtained from B by replacing column k with the
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vector 1n+1. Then
detB(n) =
n−1∏
j=0
(
−vj
2
− ρj
)
and, for k = 0, . . . , n− 1,
detB(k) = det(B˜n−k + ckJn−k)
k−1∏
j=0
(
−vj
2
− ρj
)
,
where B˜n−k is the (n− k)× (n− k) principal submatrix of B situated in the
bottom right-hand corner.
Lemma 5.4. Let B ∈R(n+1)×(n+1) be given by (5.4) with 0≤ ρ < 12v. Set
γ =
√
1
4v
2 − ρ2. Then
detB =
(
v
2
− ρ
)
(−iγ)n−1
×
{
−iγUn
(
− i(2ρ+1)
2γ
)
+
(
v
2
+ ρ
)
Un−1
(
− i(2ρ+1)
2γ
)}
.
Proof of Theorem 5.2. Let B be given by (5.4). Suppose first that
v ≥ 2n+2ρ. Then j ≥ n+ ρ− 12v for every j = 0, . . . , n− 1. Thus if p is the
ESS, then, by Lemma 5.2, pj = 0 for j = 0, . . . , n− 1, so that p= en.
Suppose next that 2ρ < v < 2n+2ρ. Define s ∈ {0, . . . , n−1} by (5.5) and
define p ∈Rn+1 by (5.6), (5.7) and (5.8). It will be shown that
{Bp}j = {Bp}n if 0≤ j ≤ s,(5.8)
{Bp}j ≤ {Bp}n if s+ 1≤ j ≤ n− 1.(5.9)
It will also be shown that p ∈∆. Since, by Lemma 5.1, any principal subma-
trix of B is conditionally negative definite, it will then follow from Haigh’s
(1975) theorem that p is the ESS.
For m= 0, . . . , n set
Bm =
 b00 . . . b0m... ...
bm0 . . . bmm
 .
According to Lemma 5.4,
detBm =
(
v
2
− ρ
){
um +
(
v
2
+ ρ
)
um−1
}
.(5.10)
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Set
B =

b00 . . . b0s b0n
...
...
...
bs0 . . . bss bsn
bn0 . . . bns bnn
 and p¯=

p0
...
ps
pn
 .
For k = 0, . . . , s+1 let B
(k)
denote the matrix obtained from B by replacing
column k with the vector 1s+2. As pk = 0 for s+1≤ k ≤ n− 1,
{Bp¯}j = {Bp}j , 0≤ j ≤ s, {Bp¯}s+1 = {Bp}n.(5.11)
The matrix B is again of the form (5.3). It follows from Lemma 5.3 that for
every k ≤ s− 1,
detB
(k)
=
(
−v
2
− ρ
)k
det

bk+1,k+1+ k . . . bk+1,s + k bk+1,n + k
...
...
...
bs,k+1+ k . . . bs,s + k bs,n + k
bn,k+1+ k . . . bn,s + k bn,n + k

=
(
−v
2
− ρ
)k
× det

v
2
− ρ− 1 −1 . . . −1 −1
v− 1 v
2
− ρ− 2 . . . −2 −2
...
...
...
...
v− 1 v− 2 . . . v
2
− ρ− (s− k) −(s− k)
v− 1 v− 2 . . . v− (s− k) v
2
− ρ− (n− k)

.
Denote the matrix in the previous line by Q. To calculate detQ augment
Q from the left by the (s− k + 1)× 1 vector (v, . . . , v)T and put on top of
the matrix thus obtained the 1× (s− k + 2) vector (12v − ρ,0, . . . ,0). This
gives a matrix which is equal to Bs−k+1 except for the element in the lower
right-hand corner, which is 12v− ρ−n+ k, while the corresponding element
of Bs−k+1 is
1
2v− ρ− s+ k− 1. Hence
detQ=
(
v
2
− ρ
)−1
det
[ v
2
− ρ 01×(s−k+1)
v1s−k+1 Q
]
=
(
v
2
− ρ
)−1
{detBs−k+1− (n− s− 1)detBs−k},
and so, by (5.10),
detB
(k)
=
(
−v
2
− ρ
)k[
us−k+1+
(
v
2
+ ρ
)
us−k
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− (n− s− 1)
{
us−k +
(
v
2
+ ρ
)
us−k−1
}]
= cpk,
provided k ≤ s − 1. Similarly, detB(s) = cps, and it follows directly from
Lemma 5.3 that
detB
(s+1)
=
(
−v
2
− ρ
)s+1
= cpn.
Thus
cp¯=
 detB
(0)
...
detB
(s+1)
 .(5.12)
Let adjB denote the adjugate matrix of B. It is readily verified that
(adjB )1s+2 =
 detB
(0)
...
detB
(s+1)
 ,(5.13)
and therefore
Bp¯=
1
c
B(adjB )1s+2 =
detB
c
1s+2.
In view of (5.11) this proves the first claim (5.8).
If s < j < n, then, by (5.5),
bjn =−j ≤−s− 1≤ v
2
− n− ρ= bnn,
and so
{Bp}j =
s∑
k=0
bjkpk + bjnpn =
s∑
k=0
bnkpk + bjnpn ≤
s∑
k=0
bnkpk + bnnpn = {Bp}n,
proving the second claim (5.9).
Finally, to show that p ∈∆ set
tj = uj+
(
s+1−n+ v
2
+ρ
)
uj−1+(s+1−n)
(
v
2
+ρ
)
uj−2, j = 1,2, . . . ,
so that the first s+ 1 entries of p can be written as
pk =
1
c
(
−v
2
− ρ
)k
ts−k+1, 0≤ k ≤ s.
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In view of (5.5),
t1 =
v
2
− ρ− n+ s < 0,
t2 =
(
v
2
+ ρ
)(
v
2
− ρ− n+ s+1
)
− (2ρ+ 1)t1 > 0.
Using the recurrence relation for the Chebyshev polynomials [Szego¨ (1975),
equation (4.7.17), page 81] one may verify that
uk =−(2ρ+1)uk−1 + γ2uk−2, k ≥ 1.
Therefore,
tk =−(2ρ+ 1)tk−1 + γ2tk−2, k ≥ 3.
It now follows by induction that (−1)ktk > 0 for all k. A short calculation
shows that c = −ts+2 + (12v − ρ)ts+1, so that (−1)s+1c > 0. (In particular,
c 6= 0, which has hitherto been tacitly assumed.) It is thus obvious that
pk ≥ 0 for 0≤ k ≤ n.
To verify that
∑n
k=0 pk = 1 note that by (5.7), (5.12) and (5.13),
n∑
k=0
pk = pn +
s∑
k=0
pk =
1
c
1Ts+2(adjB )1s+2.
By a well-known determinantal formula for partitioned matrices [Gant-
macher (1959), page 46],
1Ts+2(adjB )1s+2 = detB − det(B − 1s+21Ts+2).
Observing that, by (5.10),
detB = detBs+1− (n− s− 1)detBs
=
(
v
2
− ρ
)[
us+1 +
(
v
2
+ ρ
)
us − (n− s− 1)
{
us +
(
v
2
+ ρ
)
us−1
}]
and
det(B − 1s+21Ts+2) =
(
v
2
− ρ
)−1
{detBs+2 − (n− s− 1)detBs+1}
= us+2 +
(
v
2
+ ρ
)
us+1 − (n− s− 1)
{
us+1 +
(
v
2
+ ρ
)
us
}
,
one obtains that 1Ts+2(adjB )1s+2 = c, so that
∑n
k=0 pk = 1. 
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APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 5.1. As qTBq= qTAq−∑nj=0 q2j ρj ≤ qTAq for all
q ∈Rn+1, it suffices to show that A is conditionally negative definite. Define
the n × n matrix D by djk = 12(bjk + bkj)− bj0 − b0k + b00, j, k = 1, . . . , n.
Thus
djk = vmin{j,k}− 2cmin{j,k}− v0 + 2c0.
For k = 1, . . . , n let fk be the n× 1 vector whose first k− 1 entries are 0 and
whose remaining entries are 1. Then D can be written as
D =
n∑
k=1
(vk − vk−1− 2(ck − ck−1))fkfTk ,
showing that D is negative definite. This implies that A is conditionally
negative definite; see Haigh (1975).
The existence of an ESS now follows, since in a game with conditionally
negative definite pay-off matrix, a Nash equilibrium, which always exists,
must be an ESS. To prove uniqueness suppose p and q are ESSs. Then
pTBp≥ qTBp and qTBq≥ pTBq, so that (p− q)TB(p− q)≥ 0. Since B
is conditionally negative definite, this implies p= q. 
Proof of Lemma 5.2. The assertion is obviously true if pj = 0 for all
j < n, so assume pj > 0 for some j < n. Let m := max{j : j < n, pj > 0}.
Then pm > 0 and, as in the proof of Theorem 5.1, pn > 0, so that e
T
mBp=
eTnBp, see Hofbauer and Sigmund [(1998), page 63]. Since pj = 0 if m+1≤
j ≤ n− 1,
eTmBp=
m−1∑
k=0
(vk − ck)pk +
(
vm
2
− cm − ρm
)
pm − cmpn,
eTnBp=
m∑
k=0
(vk − ck)pk +
(
vn
2
− cn − ρn
)
pn.
Thus
0 = eTnBp− eTmBp=
(
vm
2
+ ρm
)
pm +
(
vn
2
− cn − ρn + cm
)
pn,
and it follows that vn/2− cn − ρn + cm < 0. That is, cn + ρn − vn/2 > cm.
Now suppose that j < n and cj ≥ cn + ρn − vn/2. Then cj > cm, and since
the sequence (cµ) is increasing, j >m. Thus pj = 0. 
Proof of Lemma 5.3. Suppose 1 ≤ k ≤ n − 1. For j = 0, . . . , k − 1,
add vj − cj times column k of B(k), that is, the vector 1n+1, to column j.
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For j = k + 1, . . . , n, add ck times column k to column j. The matrix thus
obtained can be partitioned asD 1k ∗0 1 0
0 1n−k B˜n−k + ckJn−k
 ,
where D is a k× k upper triangular matrix with diagonal elements −v0/2−
ρ0, . . . ,−vk−1/2− ρk−1. The assertion is now obvious. The proof is similar
for k = 0 and k = n. 
Lemma A.1. Let γ1, γ2, x ∈R, γ1, γ2 > 0. The determinant of the n× n
tridiagonal matrix
Dn(x) =

x γ1 0 0 . . . 0 0 0
−γ2 x γ1 0 . . . 0 0 0
0 −γ2 x γ1 . . . 0 0 0
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
0 0 0 0 . . . −γ2 x γ1
0 0 0 0 . . . 0 −γ2 x

is given by
detDn(x) = i
n(γ1γ2)
n/2Un
(
− ix
2
√
γ1γ2
)
.(A.1)
Proof. Note first that
detD1(x) = x, detD2(x) = x
2 + γ1γ2.
Expanding detDn(x) along the last column, one obtains that, for n> 2,
detDn(x) = xdetDn−1(x) + γ1γ2 detDn−2(x).
Denote the expression on the right-hand side of (A.1) by hn(x). Then
h1(x) = x, h2(x) = x
2 + γ1γ2,
and, by the recurrence formula for the Chebyshev polynomials [Szego¨ (1975),
(4.7.17), page 81], for n> 2,
hn(x) = i
n−1(γ1γ2)
(n−1)/2xUn−1
(
− ix
2
√
γ1γ2
)
− in(γ1γ2)n/2Un−2
(
− ix
2
√
γ1γ2
)
= xhn−1(x) + γ1γ2hn−2(x).
Now the assertion follows by induction. 
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Proof of Lemma 5.4. Define the n× n matrices F and G by
F =

v
2
− ρ
v
v
2
− ρ
v v
v
2
− ρ
...
...
v v v . . . v
v
2
− ρ

,
G=

−1 −1 −1 . . . −1
−1 −2 −2 . . . −2
−1 −2 −3 . . . −3
...
...
...
...
−1 −2 −3 . . . −n
 .
Let I denote the n× n unit matrix. Then
detB =
(
v
2
− ρ
)
det(F +G) =
(
v
2
− ρ
)
detGdet(G−1F + I).
It is easily seen that detG= (−1)n. Moreover,
G−1 =

−2 1
1 −2 1
1 −2 1
. . .
. . .
. . .
1 −2 1
1 −1

,
so that
G−1F + I =

2ρ+ 1
v
2
− ρ
−v
2
− ρ 2ρ+ 1 v
2
− ρ
−v
2
− ρ 2ρ+1 v
2
− ρ
. . .
. . .
−v
2
− ρ 2ρ+ 1 v
2
− ρ
−v
2
− ρ −v
2
+ ρ+ 1

.
It now follows by Lemma A.1 that
detB =
(
v
2
− ρ
)
(−1)n
{
inγnUn
(
− i(2ρ+1)
2γ
)
−
(
v
2
+ ρ
)
in−1γn−1Un−1
(
− i(2ρ+1)
2γ
)}
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= (−iγ)n
{(
v
2
− ρ
)
Un
(
− i(2ρ+1)
2γ
)
+ iγUn−1
(
− i(2ρ+ 1)
2γ
)}
.

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